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1A Physical Layer Network Coding Based
Modify-and-Forward with Opportunistic Secure
Cooperative Transmission Protocol
Quoc-Tuan Vien, Tuan Anh Le, Huan X. Nguyen, and Tho Le-Ngoc
Abstract—This paper investigates a new secure relaying
scheme, namely physical layer network coding based modify-
and-forward (PMF), in which a relay node linearly combines
the decoded data sent by a source node with an encrypted
key before conveying the mixed data to a destination node. We
first derive the general expression for the generalized secrecy
outage probability (GSOP) of the PMF scheme and then use
it to analyse the GSOP performance of various relaying and
direct transmission strategies. The GSOP performance compar-
ison indicates that these transmission strategies offer different
advantages depending on the channel conditions and target
secrecy rates, and relaying is not always desirable in terms
of secrecy. Subsequently, we develop an opportunistic secure
transmission protocol for cooperative wireless relay networks
and formulate an optimisation problem to determine secrecy rate
thresholds (SRTs) to dynamically select the optimal transmission
strategy for achieving the lowest GSOP. The conditions for the
existence of the SRTs are derived for various channel scenarios.
Index Terms—Wireless relay networks; physical layer network
coding; decode-and-forward; modify-and-forward; cooperative
jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security has recently attracted the interest of
broader communications societies [1], especially in coopera-
tive wireless relay networks (CWRNs) [2]–[6] where user co-
operation has been identified as an innovative change enabling
multi-hop communications [7]–[9]. The connection between a
subscriber and a legitimate transmitter can be realised with
the assistance of a relay node employing either amplify-
and-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward (DF) protocols [10].
Over the wireless media, the eavesdropper and/or attacker can
overhear the message from both the transmitter and the relay
nodes. Therefore, in order to protect data from vulnerable
attacks in the CWRNs, the security of both the direct and
relaying links needs to be investigated.
From the physical-layer perspective, information-theoretic
approach has been shown to be able to provide secure commu-
nications between legitimate users by using jamming signals
and appropriate channel coding [2]. A basic approach was
originally proposed in [11] for a noiseless cipher system
where the data is encrypted by simply XORing with a shared
secret key. The noisy channel was then investigated in [12]
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where Wyner first introduced the concept of wiretap channel.
It is shown that the innate irregularity and diversity of the
message can confuse the eavesdropper, and thus strengthen the
legitimate communications. Specifically, independent transmit-
ters can help in transmitting jamming signals to enhance the
secrecy rate of the legitimate users [13]–[15]. However, such
cooperative jamming (CJ) can cause interferences that reduce
the decoding rate at the legitimate receivers [16]–[18]. Another
approach of the CJ is noise forwarding [19] where a relay
node sends extra irregularity to direct as haphazardly chosen
codewords from codebook known to both the legitimate sender
and the beneficiary [20].
Motivated by the concept of network coding (NC) for
improving the throughput of lossless networks [21], [22], a
vast number of works have investigated the application of
physical-layer NC (PNC) in CWRNs, e.g. in [23]–[29], and
secure NC has also been proposed in [30], [31] to improve
the security of wiretap channels. The principle of the PNC
is that the relays perform algebraic linear/logic operations on
received packets from multiple transmission source nodes and
then forward the combined packets to the destination nodes in
the subsequent transmissions.
Focusing on secure communications in CWRNs, various
relaying strategies were investigated in [32]–[34]. Specifically,
secure AF and DF schemes were analysed in [32], [33].
Modify-and-forward (MF) cooperation scheme was proposed
in [34] where the relay first modifies the message received
from the source in the first time slot and then forwards the
modified message to the destination in the second time slot.
In the MF scheme, the modification process at the relay is
assumed to be inherently shared between legitimate users,
and thus only the interested destination can recover the orig-
inal message. This MF approach yields an enhanced secrecy
performance in comparison with other relaying techniques.
However, the work in [34] assumed that the eavesdropper can
only decode the message from the source in the first time slot,
which limits its application in practice since the eavesdropper
could also overhear and decode a part of the message from the
relay in the second time slot. Additionally, over the wireless
media, the channel dedicated for sharing knowledge between
the relay and the destination suffers from fading and back-
ground noise, which may cause a considerable performance
degradation. Furthermore, it can be noticed that the relaying
schemes do not always provide the best performance as they
depend on the channel quality of various links and target
secrecy rate. Therefore, it is crucial to address these practical
2issues as well as providing a numerical approach in finding the
optimal scheme among the direct and relaying schemes with
respect to the channel environment and the QoS requirement
of secrecy rate.
In this paper, inspired by the principle of PNC, we first
propose a new secure relaying scheme, namely secure PNC-
based MF (PMF), to cope with the practical security issue of
the imperfectly shared knowledge of the message modification
between relay and destination in the conventional MF scheme,
i.e. [34]. Furthermore, the proposed scheme takes into account
a practical scenario that the eavesdropper can overhear and
attempt to decode the message from both the source and the
relay in CWRNs. By deriving the generalized secrecy outage
probability (GSOP) of the PMF scheme with respect to other
direct and relaying schemes,1 the usage of the relay is shown
not to be always beneficial, especially when the link between
the source and the relay and (or) the link between the relay
and the destination suffer(s) from severe fading and noise.
This fact, however, is brought into question when the relay
should be exploited to provide a higher secure communication,
and thus motivates us to propose an opportunistic secure
transmission protocol for the CWRNs. The main contributions
of this paper can be summarised as follows:
• A novel PMF scheme for legitimate users: In the proposed
PMF scheme, the PNC operation at the relay can restrict
the eavesdropper to receiving only part of information
from the relay rather than overhearing the full mes-
sage. This PNC operation also differentiates the proposed
scheme from the cryptographic techniques with only
encrypted key. Furthermore, the assumption of perfectly
shared information of PNC coefficients and encrypted
key2 between the relay and destination is relaxed, while
only channel statistics are assumed to be known at the
destination.
• Derivation of GSOP: GSOP is considered to link the
concept of physical layer security and eavesdropper de-
codability [38], [39]. The derived GSOP for the proposed
PMF scheme reveals not only its effectiveness in rela-
tion to the conventional direct transmission (DT) [40]
and other relaying transmission (RT) schemes, such as
DF [32], CJ [13] and MF [34], but also the level of
secrecy requirements from the cryptographic perspective.
In particular, this derived GSOP is shown to be a general
expression also for the DF and MF schemes. It indicates
that the DF scheme is a special case of the PMF scheme
when neither encryption nor PNC operation is performed
at the relay and the MF scheme can be regarded as an
ideal case of the PMF scheme with no PNC operation
1This work is extended from [35], [36] where only results of the classical
SOP were provided for the PMF scheme in the scenario that the eavesdropper
can overhear the message in the first time slot, but does not attempt to decode
the message from the relay due to its lack of knowledge of the modification
process at the relay. We now take a further step by providing a detailed analysis
for deriving the GSOP of the PMF scheme to link the concept of physical
layer security and cryptography. Also, this work considers the general scenario
when the eavesdropper can overhear and attempts to decode the message from
both the source and the relay.
2The encrypted key in the proposed scheme is generated at the physical
layer as a training sequence. The design of a physical layer encryption scheme
can be referred to in [37].
and when the link between the relay and eavesdropper is
neglected.
• GSOP comparison of different schemes: The proposed
PMF scheme is shown to provide an enhanced security
with a lower GSOP under certain channel link quality,
channel knowledge and target secrecy rate when com-
pared to DT, DF and CJ schemes. Moreover, the GSOP
of the PMF scheme approaches that of the MF scheme
which is regarded as a lower bound of the PMF scheme in
an ideal scenario. It is further noticed that the DT scheme
without the assistance of the relay can achieve a higher
secrecy performance over all RT schemes at a high target
secrecy rate, especially when the direct link is of very
high quality. These remarkable facts accordingly mean
that none of these schemes are able to ensure the highest
secrecy at all times given variant channel conditions and
secrecy rate requirements.
• A new opportunistic secure transmission protocol for
CWRNs: The proposed protocol aims at finding an op-
timal protocol among DT and RT schemes that achieves
the best secrecy performance with the lowest GSOP. It
is shown that there exist secrecy rate thresholds (SRTs)
which are the crossing points between the GSOPs of
various schemes. The optimisation problem is thus turned
into finding the SRTs with respect to channel conditions
and secrecy rate requirements. Furthermore, the condi-
tions of the channel quality are derived for the existence
of the SRTs. The derived SRTs are shown to not only
facilitate the finding of the optimal scheme for a secure
CWRN, but also help in determining if the relay could
be relied on in the practical CWRNs.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
describes the system model of a typical CWRN in the presence
of an eavesdropper. Section III presents the proposed PMF
scheme. The GSOP analysis of the PMF scheme is presented
in Section IV in comparison with DT, DF, CJ and MF schemes.
The opportunistic secure transmission protocol for the CWRN
is developed in Section V where the SRTs are determined.
Numerical and simulation results are presented in Section VI
to validate the concepts. Finally, Section VII draws the main
conclusions from this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates the system model of a CWRN under
investigation consisting of a source node S , a destination node
D and a relay node R in the presence of an eavesdropper node
E . It is assumed that there exists a direct link S → D and thus
S may transmit a data packet to D either with or without the
assistance of R. In Fig. 1, E is assumed to be located between
S and D and in the vicinity of R. Therefore, there exist two
wiretap links from both S and R to E .
The communication channel between nodes A and B,
A,B ∈ {S,R, E ,D}, A 6= B, is assumed to experience
identical and independently distributed quasi-static Rayleigh
flat fading where all channel gains are time-invariant over the
whole transmission of a data packet and vary independently
in the next data packet. The instantaneous and average signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) or signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
3Fig. 1: System model of a CWRN in the presence of an eavesdropper.
(SINR) of the link A → B are denoted by γAB and γ¯AB,
respectively. The probability density function (pdf) and cumu-
lative distribution function (cdf) of a random variable X are
denoted by fX(·) and FX(·), respectively.
In the DT scheme, S transmits data directly to D, while in
the RT scheme, the cooperative data transmission from S to
D is realised via two time slots as follows:
i) Time slot 1: S transmits the data packet to both R and
D;
ii) Time slot 2: R processes the data packet received from
S prior to forwarding the processed data to D.
III. PROPOSED PMF SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the data transmission, decoding
and encryption process in our proposed PMF scheme for
enhancing the security of a CWRN as shown in Fig. 1.
In the first time slot, S transmits a data packet x to both
R and D. Over the eavesdropping channel, E also receives
the data packet from S. The received signal at node X , X ∈
{R,D, E}, is given by
r
(1)
X =
√
ΛShSXx + n
(1)
X , (1)
where ΛS is the power of the source S, hSX is the channel
gain between S and X , and n(1)X is an independent circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) noise vector at node X
with each entry having zero mean and variance of σ20 . Then,
X decodes the data from S, which is denoted by x¯(1)X .
In the second time slot, after decoding the data packet
received from S,3 the relay node R randomly and linearly
3Note that a trusted relay channel is considered in this work where the
relay can decode the confidential message prior to processing and forwarding
it to the destination. The scenario of untrusted relay channels can be coped
with by applying modulo-and-forward scheme at the relay with nested lattice
encoding at the source as in [41].
combines the decoded data, i.e. x¯(1)R , with the encrypted key
(denoted by k) using randomised PNC approach as follows:
x
(2)
R = αx¯
(1)
R + βk, (2)
where α and β are random PNC coefficients satisfying α2 +
β2 = 1 and α 6= 0.
Through the second hop, D is expected to receive the data
from R, while E could overhear the same information. The
received signal at node Y , Y ∈ {D, E}, is given by
r
(2)
Y =
√
ΛRhRYx
(2)
R + n
(2)
Y , (3)
where ΛR is the power of the relay R, hRY is the channel
gain between R and Y , and n(2)Y is a CSCG noise vector at
node Y with each entry having zero mean and variance of σ20 .
Substituting (2) into (3), we obtain
r
(2)
Y =
√
ΛRhRYαx¯
(1)
R +
√
ΛRhRYβk + n
(2)
Y . (4)
Although the PNC coefficients and encrypted key are only
shared between the legitimate users, E can still decode the data
sent from R by treating these unknowns as interference and
performing maximum ratio combining (MRC) of the signals
received in both time slots from S andR. On the other hand, it
is likely that D can decode the interested data given the shared
information between S , R and D. However, at D, imperfectly
shared knowledge of the PNC coefficients and encrypted key
can also take place due to the inherent fading and noises of
the wireless channels. In other words, we need to consider the
following two cases:
i) PMF-perfect: With perfectly shared knowledge of α, β
and k, D is able to decode the data from R in the second
time slot by eliminating α, β and k in (4).
ii) PMF-imperfect: This case implies that D may only obtain
partial knowledge of α, β and k (either of them but
not all). D can employ maximum likelihood detection to
4recover the data in the second time slot given the known
channel statistics of the link R → D.
Remark 1 (Improved Security With the Proposed PMF). As
shown in (4), in order to encrypt the data packet forwarded
from the relay node R, two layers of security are integrated
into the PMF scheme including the PNC coefficients, i.e. α
and β, and the encrypted key, i.e. k. Such modification process
at R can thus confuse the eavesdropper E from overhearing
the full message from R, which accordingly results in a more
secure relay communications between legitimate users. It can
also be noticed that the cryptographic techniques correspond
to the scenario when the PNC is not employed at R, and
thus only the encrypted key is required at the eavesdropper to
decode the overheard packet.
Remark 2 (DF & MF - Special Cases of the Proposed PMF).
It can be seen in (4) that the conventional DF scheme can be
deduced from the PMF scheme by setting α = 1 and β = 0,
which means there is no encrypted key and no PNC operation
at R. In relation to the work in [34], the MF scheme assumes
that E omits the message from R due to the unavailability
of the modification process performed at R, and thus can
be regarded as a special case of the PMF when the link
R → E does not exist. However, it is worth mentioning
that such assumption of no decoding process performed at
E in the second time slot may restrict the application of
the MF scheme in practice. Instead, our work considers a
general scenario dealing with the issue when E can partially
decodes the message from R by treating the encrypted key as
interference.
Regarding the complexity of the proposed PMF scheme at
the relay, only arithmetic functions are required to combine the
data packet and the encrypted key. From (2), it can be seen that
there are a total of M additions and 2M multiplications where
M is the data packet length. In other words, as compared to the
conventional DF scheme (which simply decodes and amplifies
the data packet received from the source), the security of
the proposed scheme comes at the cost of an increase in
computational complexity. Modulo addition (instead of linear
addition) can be used with lattice code (as in [41]) in the
scenario of untrusted relay channels for energy savings.
IV. GENERALIZED SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS
In this section, we first derive the GSOP of the proposed
PMF scheme for a CWRN considering the general scenario
of imperfectly shared information of message modification
between relay and destination, i.e. PMF-imperfect scheme.
For comparison, the GSOP of DT scheme [40] and other
RT schemes, including DF [32], CJ [13] and MF [34], are
also provided to verify the effectiveness of the PMF scheme
as well as motivating us to propose an opportunistic secure
transmission protocol which will be presented in the following
section.
The GSOP is defined as the probability that the wireless
system fails to achieve a target secrecy rate subject to secrecy
requirements [38], i.e.
Pout , Pr
{
Cs
Rs
< θ
}
, (5)
where Rs is the target secrecy rate, Cs is the instantaneous
secrecy capacity and θ, 0 < θ ≤ 1, is the minimum acceptable
value of the fractional equivocation, i.e. the ratio of Cs to
Rs. Here, θ represents the level of secrecy requirements. A
particular case is when θ = 1, then the GSOP turns into the
classical SOP. In (5), Cs can be computed by
Cs = max{Cd − Ce, 0} = [Cd − Ce]+ , (6)
where Cd is the instantaneous channel capacity of the le-
gitimate links, Ce is the instantaneous channel capacity of
the eavesdropper links, and [x]+ , max{x, 0}. Intuitively, it
can be observed in (6) that, to have a secure communication
with a positive secrecy capacity, the legitimate links must be
dominant over the eavesdropper links.
A. PMF Scheme
We now proceed to derive Cd and Ce of the PMF scheme.
Taking into account both direct and relaying links with decod-
ing and PNC operation at R, the maximum rate for reliable
data communications between S and D can be expressed by
Cd = min
{
1
2
log2(1 + γSR),
1
2
log2(1 + γSD + γRD)
}
,
(7)
where γSR and γSD denote the instantaneous SNR of the link
S → R and S → D, respectively, in the first time slot, and
γRD denotes the instantaneous SINR of the link R → D in
the second time slot. Here, the instantaneous SNR γSR and
γSD can be respectively computed from (1) as
γSR =
ΛS |hSR|2
σ20
, (8)
γSD =
ΛS |hSD|2
σ20
. (9)
In the second time slot, D receives the combined data from
R consisting of both the interested information and encrypted
key. From (4), γRD can be determined by
γRD =
ΛR|hRD|2α2
ΛR|hRD|2β2 + σ20
. (10)
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, E can
eavesdrop the data from S and R in both time slots. Such
information leakage can be intuitively measured by comparing
the uncertainty about the message before and after E receives
it [42]. From an information theoretical point of view, this
leakage is the mutual information and the maximum rate
for reliable eavesdropping or the maximum leakage rate is
the channel capacity of the eavesdropper link. Taking the
advantage of both diversity branches with MRC approach, the
maximum leakage rate at E is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2(1 + γSE + γRE), (11)
where γSE and γRE are respectively given by
γSE =
ΛS |hSE |2
σ20
, (12)
5γRE =
ΛR|hRE |2α2
ΛR|hRE |2β2 + σ20
. (13)
Remark 3 (Impact of PNC Coefficients on GSOP Perfor-
mance). It can be seen in (10) and (13) that the PNC coeffi-
cients affect both the SINR of both legitimate linkR → D and
eavesdropping link R → E in the second time slot. In order to
validate their impacts on the GSOP performance, for instance,
let us consider a specific scenario when γSR > γSD + γRD
and γSD ≈ γSE . It can be shown that, as α increases (or
β decreases), (γRD − γRE) increases if |hRD|2 ≥ |hRE |2;
otherwise, (γRD − γRE) decreases. This accordingly results
in the change of the GSOP. The finding of the optimal PNC
coefficients at R is worth to investigate taking into account all
channel gains. In the general case, the knowledge of all these
gains is required to be either perfectly known or estimated at
R. This is however beyond the scope of this work where R is
only required to know the channel from S to decode the data
packet prior to employing the random PNC.
Substituting (7) and (11) into (6), the secrecy capacity, i.e.
CS , can be obtained and the GSOP of the PMF can be thus
derived from (5) as
P
(PMF )
out =Pr
{[
log2
(
1+min{γSR, γSD+γRD}
1 + γSE + γRE
)]+
<2θRs
}
.
(14)
In order to analyse (14), let us firstly find the pdf of γSR,
γSD, γRD, γSE and γRE defined in (8), (9), (10), (12) and
(13), respectively. Since the links between nodes are assumed
to experience Rayleigh flat fading, the pdf of the SNR γAB,
AB ∈ {SR,SD,SE} is given by [43]
fγAB(γAB) =
1
γ¯AB
exp
(
−γAB
γ¯AB
)
, (15)
while the pdf of the SINRs γRD and γRE can be obtained
using the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If X = c|Z|2, where c is a positive constant, Z is
a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
of 1, and Y =
a2X
b2X + 1
, where a2 + b2 = 1 and a 6= 0, then
the pdf of Y is given by
fY (y) =
a2
c(a2 − b2y)2 exp
[
− y
c(a2 − b2y)
]
. (16)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From the above Lemma 1, the pdf of the SINR γA′B′ ,
A′B′ ∈ {RD,RE}, can be expressed by
fγA′B′ (γA′B′) =
α2
γ¯A′B′(α2 − β2γA′B′)2
× exp
[ −γA′B′
γ¯A′B′(α2 − β2γA′B′)
]
.
(17)
Remark 4 (General pdf of SINR γRD and γRE ). It can be
observed that the pdf of the SNR in (15) is a special form
of the pdf of the SINR in (17) when α = 1 and β = 0.
In the scenario that the encrypted key and PNC operation at
R are known at D, the proposed PMF is regarded as PMF-
perfect scheme when γRD is given by (15). In case that such
modification process at R is known at both D and E , then
both γRD and γRE are computed by (15). We then have
a more special case of the PMF scheme which is indeed
the conventional DF scheme as also noticed in Remark 2.
However, it is worth noting that the eavesdropper in our work
can overhear the message in both time slots but only a partial
information can be recovered in the second time slot given
imperfect knowledge of the modification process at R. This
accordingly reflects the novelty of our work in the GSOP
analysis of the PMF scheme for CWRNs.
Given the pdf of all channel links in (15) and (17), further
derivation of (14) leads to the following finding:
Theorem 1. The GSOP of the proposed PMF scheme is
obtained by (18) (see the top of next page), where
I1(x) ,
∫ x
0
fU (u)
∫ x−u
2−2θRs (1+x)−1−u
fV (v) dv du, (19)
I2(x) ,
∫ x
0
fU (u)
∫ x−u
0
fV (v) dv du, (20)
fX(x) =
1
γ¯SR
exp
(
− x
γ¯SR
)
, (21)
fY (y) =
1
γ¯SD
exp
(
− y
γ¯SD
)
, (22)
fZ(z) =
α2
γ¯RD(α2 − β2z)2 exp
(
− z
γ¯RD(α2 − β2z)
)
, (23)
fU (u) =
1
γ¯SE
exp
(
− u
γ¯SE
)
. (24)
fV (z) =
α2
γ¯RE(α2 − β2v)2 exp
(
− v
γ¯RE(α2 − β2v)
)
, (25)
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is noted that the derivation of the closed-form expression
for the GSOP of the proposed PMF in Theorem 1 is challeng-
ing. Nevertheless, the GSOP of the conventional DF and MF
schemes in the following subsection can be derived from (18)
as special cases of the PMF scheme.
B. DT Scheme
In DT scheme, the relay is assumed to be unavailable and
thus, for fair comparison, S sends the encoded data to D using
the power of 2ΛS . The GSOP of the DT is given by [40]
P
(DT )
out = Pr
{[
log2
(
1 + 2γSD
1 + 2γSE
)]+
< θRs
}
= 1− γ¯SD
γ¯SD + 2θRs γ¯SE
exp
(
1− 2θRs
2γ¯SD
)
.
(26)
6P
(PMF )
out =
∫ ∞
22θRs−1
fY (y)
∫ ∞
y
fX(x)
∫ ∞
x−y
fZ(z)I1(x) dz dx dy
+
∫ ∞
22θRs−1
fX(x)
∫ ∞
x
fY (y)I1(x) dy dx
+
∫ 22θRs−1
0
fY (y)
∫ ∞
22θRs−1
fX(x)
∫ ∞
x−y
fZ(z)I1(x) dz dx dy
+
∫ 22θRs−1
0
fY (y)
∫ 22θRs−1
y
fX(x)
∫ ∞
x−y
fZ(z)I2(x) dz dx dy
+
∫ ∞
22θRs−1
fX(x)
∫ x
22θRs−1
fY (y)
∫ x−y
22θRs−1−y
fZ(z)I1(y + z) dz dy dx (18)
C. CJ Scheme
Let us consider a typical CJ scheme in [13]. The principle
of the CJ is that different transmitters transmit jamming
signals with the aim of interfering the illegitimate receiver. In
the context of the considered CWRN, R transmits jamming
signals while S transmits the data to D. Due to the autonomous
property of the jamming signals, they may confuse E from
eavesdropping the data; however, it can be noticed that such
jamming signals could also harm D. The GSOP of the CJ
scheme can be computed by
P
(CJ)
out = Pr

log2
1 +
γSD
γRD + 1
1 +
γSE
γRE + 1


+
< 2θRs
 , (27)
where
γRD =
ΛR|hRD|2
σ20
. (28)
γRE =
ΛR|hRE |2
σ20
. (29)
Following [13], P (CJ)out can be derived in closed form as
P
(CJ)
out =1−
2−δ
γ¯RDζ
+
2−δ
γ¯RDγ¯REζ2
[
22θRs γ¯SE(ζ + 1)
γ¯SD
Ξ
(
1 + ϑ
γ¯RE
)
+(ζ − ϑ)Ξ
(
1 + ϑ
ϑ
(δ + γ¯−1RD)
)]
,
(30)
where δ , (22θRs − 1)γ¯−1SD, ϑ , 22θRs γ¯SE γ¯−1SD, ζ ,
δ + γ¯−1RD − ϑγ¯−1RE and Ξ(x) , exE1(x). Here, E1(x) ,∫ ∞
x
e−tt−1dt is the exponential integral [44].
D. DF Scheme
In this scheme, R follows the conventional DF relaying
scheme [10]. That is, R decodes the data from S , re-encodes
the decoded data and then forwards the encoded data to D.
The GSOP of the DF scheme is given by
P
(DF )
out =Pr
{[
log2
(
1+min{γSR, γSD+γRD}
1 + γSE + γRE
)]+
<2θRs
}
,
(31)
where γRD and γRE are given by (28) and (29), respectively.4
According to [32], P (DF )out can be derived as
P
(DF )
out =
2−2θRs γ¯SR [Θ(γ¯SE)Ψ(γ¯SE)−Θ(γ¯RE)Ψ(γ¯RE)]
(γ¯RE − γ¯SE)(γ¯RD − γ¯SD)
+
Θ(γ¯RE)−Θ(γ¯SE)
γ¯RE − γ¯SE ,
(32)
where
Θ(x) , x
2
2−2θRs γ¯SR + x
exp
(
1− 2−2θRs
x
)
, (33)
Ψ(x) , γ¯SR
x(1 + γ¯SR/γ¯SD) + 2−2θRs γ¯SR
− γ¯SR
x(1 + γ¯SR/γ¯RD) + 2−2θRs γ¯SR
.
(34)
Remark 5 (GSOP of DF Scheme). As noticed in Remark 4,
the DF scheme is a special case of the PMF scheme when the
SINRs of the links R → D and R → E are replaced by the
SNRs of those links with no encryption and PNC operation.
Indeed, the GSOP of the DF scheme in (32) can be derived
from that of the PMF scheme in Theorem 1 by setting α = 1
and β = 0 for the pdf of both γRD and γRE in (18).
Remark 6 (Lower GSOP With PMF-Perfect Over DF
Scheme). In the PMF-perfect scheme, given the fact that the
message modification at R is perfectly shared between legit-
imate users, the SINR of the link R → D can be simplified
to be the SNR of that link (see Remark 4), while the SINR
of the link R → E is unchanged since E does not know the
modification process atR. Furthermore, it can be easily shown
that ΛR|hRE |2/σ2 > ΛR|hRE |2α2/(ΛR|hRE |2β2+σ2), ∀ 0 ≤
α, β ≤ 1. Therefore, from (14) and (31), it can be concluded
that the PMF-perfect scheme achieves a lower GSOP for an
4Note that the SNRs of links R → D and R → E in the couterpart RT
schemes are different from the SINRs of those links in the proposed PMF
scheme (see (10) and (13)).
7enhanced security compared to the DF scheme, which verifies
the statement in Remark 1.5
E. MF Scheme
In MF scheme [34], R decodes the source message, mod-
ifies the message and then forwards the modified message to
D with the assumption that the knowledge of the message
modification process at R is perfectly shared between R and
D, and E is not able to utilise the modified message from R.
The GSOP of the MF scheme is thus given by
P
(MF )
out =Pr
{[
log2
(
1+min{γSR, γSD+γRD}
1 + γSE
)]+
<2θRs
}
.
(35)
Following [34], P (MF )out can be derived as
P
(MF )
out = 1−
Φ(γ¯RD)− Φ(γ¯SD)
γ¯RD − γ¯SD , (36)
where
Φ(x) ,
(
1 +
x
γ¯SR
)
e(1−2
2θRs )(γ¯−1SR+x
−1)
×
(
1
γ¯−1SR + x−1
− 1
2−2θRs γ¯−1SE + γ¯
−1
SR + x−1
)
.
(37)
Remark 7 (GSOP of MF Scheme). From (31) and (35), it can
be observed that the GSOP of the MF scheme can be deduced
from that of the DF scheme given γRE = 0. In fact, in the
MF scheme, it is assumed that E can only decode the message
from S in the first time slot, which implies that γRE = 0. The
MF scheme can be referred to as an ‘ideal’ DF scheme with
γRE = 0, and consequently a special case of our proposed
PMF scheme (see Remark 2). The GSOP of the MF scheme
in (36) can be therefore derived from that of the PMF scheme
in (18) in Theorem 1 when α = 1, β = 0 and γRE = 0.
Remark 8 (Much Lower GSOP With MF Scheme for an Ideal
Case). From (14), (31) and (35), it can be easily seen that the
MF scheme with the absence of the link R → E achieves
the lowest GSOP compared to the PMF and DF schemes.
Although such assumption in the MF scheme does not sound
naturally in practice when the eavesdropper can overhear the
message from all nodes, the GSOP of the MF scheme can
be regarded as a performance benchmark providing the lower
bound of the proposed PMF scheme.
Remark 9 (Lower and Upper Bounds of the PMF Scheme).
It can be seen that γ(PMF )RE ≥ γ(MF )RE = 0 and γ(PMF )RE =
λR|hRE |2α2
λR|hRE |2β2+σ20 ≤ γ
(DF )
RE =
λR|hRE |2
σ20
when α2 ≤ 1, and thus
C
(MF )
e ≤ C(PMF )e ≤ C(DF )e . From (5) and (6), we have
5Note that the above claim in Remark 6 is not applied for the case of
the PMF-imperfect scheme, which will be verified in the numerical results.
Although no conclusion can be straightforwardly drawn for the PMF-imperfect
scheme, it is worth claiming an enhanced security achieved with the proposed
PMF scheme since the shared knowledge of signaling information between
the legitimate users is normally guaranteed by a dedicated channel. For
completeness, in this work, we consider both imperfectly and perfectly shared
knowledge between legitimate users in the PMF scheme.
P
(MF )
out ≤ P (PMF )out ≤ P (DF )out . This means that the GSOP of
the PMF scheme is lower and upper bounded by that of the
MF and DF schemes, respectively.
V. OPPORTUNISTIC SECURE TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
FOR CWRNS
In a practical CWRN, it can be intuitively seen that the
usage of relay node may be unnecessary if the link between
source and relay and/or the link between relay and destination
suffer(s) from severe fading and noise. In other words, DT
scheme could be favourable over RT schemes given a domi-
nant direct link of very high quality compared to relaying links.
This accordingly raises a research problem in our considered
system model to find out when the relay should be used to
provide a higher secure communication over the DT scheme.
For clarity, let us consider the following example:
Example 1. The SNRs of the links in a CWRN (see Fig. 1)
are set as γ¯SR = 12 dB, γ¯RD = 10 dB, γ¯SE = 5 dB and
γ¯RE = 7 dB. Fig. 2 plots the GSOP of DT, DF, CJ, MF, PMF-
perfect and PMF-imperfect schemes versus the target secrecy
rate, i.e. Rs [b/s/Hz], with PNC coefficients {α2 = 0.7, β2 =
0.3}, level of secrecy requirement θ = 1 and with respect
to two values of γ¯SD = {0, 12} dB. It can be seen that the
GSOP of the DT scheme achieves the best performance when
γ¯SD = 12 dB, while there exists a crossing point between the
GSOPs of the DT, DF, MF, PMF-perfect and PMF-imperfect
schemes when γ¯SD = 0 dB. For instance, the GSOP of the DT
scheme intersects with that of the PMF-imperfect, DF, PMF-
perfect, and MF schemes when Rs = Rs,1 = 0.07 b/s/Hz,
Rs = Rs,2 = 0.66 b/s/Hz, Rs = Rs,3 = 1.2 b/s/Hz and
Rs = Rs,4 = 1.8 b/s/Hz, respectively. We have the following
observations when γ¯SD = 0 dB:
i) If Rs < Rs,1, then P
(DT )
out > P
(PMF−imperfect)
out >
P
(DF )
out > P
(PMF−perfect)
out > P
(MF )
out ;
ii) If Rs,1 6 Rs < Rs,2, then P (PMF−imperfect)out >
P
(DT )
out > P
(DF )
out > P
(PMF−perfect)
out > P
(MF )
out ;
ii) If Rs,2 6 Rs < Rs,3, then P (PMF−imperfect)out >
P
(DF )
out > P
(DT )
out > P
(PMF−perfect)
out > P
(MF )
out ;
iv) If Rs,3 6 Rs < Rs,4, then P (PMF−imperfect)out >
P
(DF )
out > P
(PMF−perfect)
out > P
(DT )
out > P
(MF )
out ;
iv) If Rs > Rs,4, then P (PMF−imperfect)out > P
(DF )
out >
P
(PMF−perfect)
out > P
(MF )
out > P
(DT )
out .
This accordingly reflects that the relay may be helpful in
providing a lower GSOP at a specific range of the target
secrecy rate, while the DT scheme could provide a better
secrecy performance without any support of the relay.
Inspired from the above observations in Example 1, we
introduce an optimisation problem as follows
min
X∈{DT,RT}
P
(X)
out , (38)
where P (X)out of various schemes is derived in Section III.
The optimisation problem in (38) aims to find the best
transmission strategies, in terms of lowest GSOP, amongst
the DT scheme and various RT schemes, i.e. DF, MF and
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Fig. 2: Illustration of threshold of Rs for selecting appropriate schemes for secure communications.
PMF. Considering the GSOP as a function of the target secrecy
rate, i.e. Rs, Example 1 suggests that there may exist crossing
points or intersections between the GSOP curves. Having in
mind that an intersection between two GSOP curves identifies
their different trends, one can easily find the lower GSOP
curve at a given Rs. Therefore, in order to avoid an exhaustive
search when solving (38), it is crucial to find the existence
conditions of these crossing points. Let us first introduce the
following propositions:
Proposition 1. Given two non-negative increasing functions
f(x) and g(x) with
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
> 0, then ∃!x′ > 0 :
f(x′) = g(x′) if and only if f(0) < g(0).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 2. Given three non-negative increasing functions
f(x), g(x) and h(x) having
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
>
dh(x)
dx
> 0,
if f(0) > g(0) and ∃!x1 > 0 : f(x1) = h(x1), then ∃!x2 >
0 : g(x2) = h(x2).
Proof. From Proposition 1, given
df(x)
dx
>
dh(x)
dx
> 0, if
∃!x1 > 0 : f(x1) = h(x1), then we have f(0) < h(0), and
thus h(0) > g(0). Accordingly, it can be deduced that ∃!x2 >
0 : g(x2) = h(x2) since
dg(x)
dx
>
dh(x)
dx
> 0 and g(0) <
h(0).
The findings in Propositions 1 and 2 verify the crossing
points of the GSOP curves of the DT, DF, MF and the proposed
PMF in Fig. 2 at different values of Rs. For simplicity,
let us consider DT and MF scheme as an exemplary RT
scheme due to its tractability with the GSOP derived in the
previous section, while the other RT schemes will be validated
through numerical results in Section V. The conditions of the
intersection between two GSOP curves of the DT and RT
schemes are determined as in the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. On the subject of target secrecy rate, i.e. Rs,
there exists a single crossing point of two GSOP curves for the
DT and RT schemes if γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR, γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2
and γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2. That is ∃!R′s > 0 : P (DT )out (R′s) =
P
(RT )
out (R
′
s)
Proof. See Appendix D.
For convenience, let Ωcross denote the set of conditions for
the crossover of DT and RT schemes in Theorem 2, i.e.
Ωcross ={(γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR) ∧ (γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2)
∧ (γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2)}.
(39)
We have the following observation:
Remark 10 (Existence of a Secrecy Rate Threshold (SRT)
for Opportunistic Secure RT Protocol). From Theorem 2, if
the channel quality satisfies the condition set Ωcross in (39),
then there exists a SRT, i.e. Rth, which is the crossing point
between the GSOPs of DT and RT schemes. Specifically, it
can be deduced that{
P
(DT )
out (Rs) > P
(RT )
out (Rs) if Rs < Rth
P
(DT )
out (Rs) ≤ P (RT )out (Rs) if Rs ≥ Rth
(40)
This accordingly means that we should select the RT scheme
for a lower GSOP if the target secrecy rate is smaller than
the SRT, while the DT scheme is preferable to achieve a
higher target secrecy rate. Also, notice that if the SRT does
not exist, i.e. the condition set Ωcross is not satisfied, then the
DT scheme should be selected as P (DT )out (Rs) < P
(RT )
out (Rs),
e.g. see Fig. 2 in Example 1 when γSD = 12 dB.
Therefore, given Ωcross, solving the optimisation problem
(38) is turned into finding SRT between DT and each of RT
schemes, i.e. DF, MF and PMF, as follows:
Rth =
{
Rs
∣∣∣P (DT )out (Rs) = P (RT )out (Rs) ∩ Ωcross} . (41)
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Fig. 3: GSOP versus target secrecy rate.
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Fig. 4: GSOP versus target secrecy rate with respect to
different secrecy requirements.
Using the derived GSOPs of various schemes in Section IV,
Rth can be found via a simple numerical method and the
optimal scheme can be opportunistically determined as in
Remark 10.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first illustrate the GSOP achieved with
the proposed PMF scheme in CWRNs. In order to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed PMF, the performance of
DT [40], DF [32], CJ [13] and MF [34] are provided for
comparison. The results are obtained with MATLAB under
different scenarios of the wireless channel quality and the
target secrecy rate. We then present the findings of SRTs for
opportunistic secure RT protocol with respect to the quality of
various links.
A. GSOP of DT & various RT Schemes
1) GSOP versus Target Secrecy Rate: Figure 3 plots the
GSOP of various schemes as a function of the target secrecy
rate, i.e. Rs. The SNRs of all links are set as γ¯SR = 12 dB,
γ¯RD = 10 dB, γ¯SD = 5 dB, γ¯RE = 7 dB and γ¯SE = 5
dB. Note that the eavesdropper can be a neighbouring node
of the relay and destination nodes, and thus the eavesdropping
links can have approximately the same SNR values as those
of the direct and relaying links. The PNC coefficients and the
level of secrecy requirement are set as {α2 = 0.7, β2 = 0.3}
and θ = 1, respectively. In Fig. 3, as noticed in the proof
of Theorem 2, it can be seen that the GSOP increases over
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Fig. 5: GSOP versus SNR of the link S → E .
Rs and the gradient of the GSOP of the RT schemes is higher
than that of the DT scheme. The PMF-perfect scheme is shown
to achieve an improved GSOP performance over the DF, CJ
and PMF-imperfect scheme, while the DT scheme achieves a
better performance at high Rs. This accordingly verifies the
statement in Remark 6 regarding the lower GSOP achieved
with the PMF-perfect over the DF scheme, and also confirms
the existence of the SRTs as stated in Remark 10. Additionally,
it can be observed that the MF scheme achieves a lower GSOP
compared to the proposed PMF-perfect scheme due to the
neglect of the link R → E . This is indeed regarded as the
lower bound of the proposed PMF scheme, which according
to Remark 8 the MF scheme is an ideal case though unnatural.6
Moreover, the numerical and analytical results in Section III
are shown to be consistent with the simulation results.
Considering different secrecy requirements, Fig. 4 illustrates
the GSOP versus target secrecy rate, i.e. Rs, with respect to
different levels of secrecy requirement, i.e. θ. Specifically, two
scenarios of θ = 1 and θ = 0.4 are considered, while the other
parameters are similarly set as in Fig. 3. It can be observed
in Fig. 4 that a relaxed secrecy requirement with a lower θ
results in a lower secrecy outage and the GSOP is also shown
to increase for all cases as the target secrecy rate increases.
For simplicity, in the rest of this section, let us consider the
scenario when θ = 1.
2) Impacts of Eavesdropper Links: Figures 5 and 6 sequen-
tially plot the GSOP of various schemes for secure CWRN as
a function of the average SNRs of the links S → E , i.e. γ¯SE ,
and R → E , i.e. γ¯RE , respectively. In Fig. 5, the range of
γ¯SE is selected to cover −10 dB to 12 dB and γ¯RE = 7 dB,
while γ¯RE is in the range from −10 to 10 dB in Fig. 6 and
γ¯SE = 5 dB. In both figures, the SNRs of other channels are
set as γ¯SR = 12 dB, γ¯SD = 5 dB, γ¯RD = 10 dB, the target
secrecy rate is Rs = 0.1 b/s/Hz and the PNC coefficients are
{α2 = 0.7, β2 = 0.3}.
As shown in Fig. 5, a higher γ¯SE causes a higher GSOP as
the eavesdropper can more reliably decode the source message.
6Note that the MF scheme always provides a lower GSOP compared to
the DF and PMF schemes. Also, the GSOP of the PMF-imperfect scheme
is always higher than that of the PMF-perfect scheme. Therefore, in what
follows, we only discuss the PMF-perfect scheme (say PMF in short) with
respect to DT, DF and CJ schemes, while the performance of the PMF-
imperfect and MF schemes is only plotted for completeness, but not repeatedly
interpreted for their reasoning.
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Fig. 7: GSOP versus SNR of the link S → R.
It can be observed that the proposed PMF scheme achieves
a lower GSOP compared to the DF and CJ schemes over the
whole range of γ¯SE and performs better than the DT scheme at
high γ¯SE , while the DT scheme achieves a better performance
at low γ¯SE which is corresponding to the scenario when E can
not reliably decode the message from S. This again verifies
our statements in Remarks 1 and 6 regarding the improved
security with the proposed PMF scheme as well as confirming
Remark 10 in respect of the SRTs between the DT and RT
schemes. A similar observation can be made in Fig. 6 where
the proposed PMF is shown to achieve a better performance
compared to the DT, DF and CJ schemes.
3) Impacts of Relaying Links: In CWRN, both links S →
R and R → D need to be considered for reliable relaying.
Figs. 7 and 8 plot GSOP of DT and various RT schemes in-
cluding DF, CJ, MF, PMF-imperfect and PMF-perfect schemes
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Fig. 9: GSOP versus SNR of the link S → D.
versus γ¯SR and γ¯RD, respectively. It is assumed that γ¯RD =
10 dB in Fig. 7 and γ¯SR = 12 dB in Fig. 8. In both figures, the
SNRs of other channels are set as γ¯SD = 5 dB, γ¯RE = 7 dB
and γ¯SE = 5 dB. Similarly, the target secrecy rate is Rs = 0.1
b/s/Hz and the PNC coefficients are {α2 = 0.7, β2 = 0.3}.
It can be observed in both Figs. 7 and 8 that a lower GSOP
is achieved with the proposed PMF scheme compared to the
DF scheme and also shown to be better than the DT scheme
at high γ¯SR. In fact, the high-quality link S → R provides a
reliable relaying, and thus R can help to enhance the security
in CWRN. At low γ¯SR, e.g. γ¯SR < 6 dB, R may not be
able to reliably decode the data message from S and thus the
DT scheme is beneficial in this case. Additionally, in Fig. 7,
the performance of the DT and CJ schemes is shown to be
independent of γ¯SR as there is no relay involved in the DT
scheme and the jamming process at R in the CJ scheme does
not rely on the reliability of the link S → R. It can also be
noticed in Fig. 8 that the CJ scheme even has a poorer GSOP
performance when γ¯RD increases since the jamming signals at
R also causes a considerable harm on the message decoding
at D, especially in a very good channel condition.
4) Impacts of Direct Link: Taking into account the direct
link S → D in CWRN, Fig. 9 plots the GSOP of various
schemes as a function of γ¯SD. The SNRs of other links
are γ¯SR = 12 dB, γ¯RD = 10 dB, γ¯RE = 7 dB and
γ¯SE = 5 dB. Similarly, the target secrecy rate and the PNC
coefficients are Rs = 0.1 b/s/Hz and {α2 = 0.7, β2 = 0.3}.
It can be observed in Fig. 9 that the proposed PMF scheme
achieves a lower GSOP than the DF scheme. The PMF is also
shown to be better than the DT and CJ schemes at low γ¯SD.
However, at high γ¯SD, the DT scheme is shown to be the best
scheme as the usage of R is not necessary in this case, even
degrading the performance. This again verifies the statement
in Remark 10 regarding the necessity of determining the SRT
for opportunistic secure transmission scheme in the CWRN.
B. SRTs for Opportunistic Secure RT Protocol
1) SRTs w.r.t. Quality of Relaying Links: Considering the
impacts of the links S → R and R → D on determining SRT
for opportunistic secure communication protocol, Figs. 10 and
11 plot the SRT, i.e. Rth, of DF, MF and the proposed PMF
schemes as a function of γ¯SR and γ¯RD, respectively. The
SNRs of other channel links are similarly set as in Fig. 7
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Fig. 11: SRT of various RT schemes versus γ¯RD.
and Fig. 8. It can be observed in both figures that Rth = 0
at low γ¯SR. In fact, when γ¯SR is low, the condition set in
Theorem 2, i.e. Ωcross in (39), is not satisfied, and thus there
do not exist any crossing points between the GSOP curves
of the DT scheme and other schemes. This means that the
DT scheme is optimal in the low-SNR regime of the link
S → R (see Remark 10). It can also be observed that Rth
increases as either γ¯SR or γ¯RD increases. This is due to the
fact that a higher SNR of the relaying links results in a better
GSOP performance of the RT schemes, and thus, as shown in
Proposition 2, a higher Rth is obtained.
2) SRTs w.r.t. Quality of Direct Link: Taking into account
the direct link S → D, Fig. 12 plots Rth of various RT
schemes as a function of γ¯SD. The range of γ¯SD is assumed
to vary from 0 to 10 dB and the SNRs of other channel links
are set as in Fig. 9. Different from Figs. 10 and 11, it can be
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Fig. 12: SRT of various RT schemes versus γ¯SD.
observed in Fig. 12 that the increase of γ¯SD results in a lower
Rth and such decrease approaches 0 as γ¯SD ≥ 10 dB. This
accordingly means that if the direct link is of high quality, then
the DT scheme is more beneficial than the RT schemes with
a lower GSOP and also a lower Rth. In fact, at high γ¯SD dB,
the condition set Ωcross is not satisfied (see (39)), and hence,
as noticed in Remark 10 with an illustration in Example 1, the
DT scheme is optimal in the high-SNR regime of the direct
link.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an efficient PMF scheme has been proposed
for secure CWRNs to cope with the scenario when the eaves-
dropper can overhear the message from both the source and the
relay, and also the imperfectly shared knowledge between the
relay and destination as in the conventional MF scheme. By
employing PNC at the relay with encrypted key, the proposed
scheme has been shown to provide a higher security compared
to the conventional DF and CJ schemes with respect to various
channel conditions and target secrecy rates. Additionally, the
GSOP of the PMF scheme has been derived, which is a general
form of the DF and MF schemes. The PMF scheme is shown
to provide higher security compared to the DF scheme while
approaching the MF scheme of which the GSOP is a lower
bound in an ideal case of no communication link between the
relay and the eavesdropper. Furthermore, we have proposed
an opportunistic secure transmission protocol by finding the
SRTs for determining the optimal scheme with or without the
assistance of the relay. Depending on the quality of channel
links, the conditions for the existence of the SRTs have been
derived. It is shown that the SRTs increase as the SNR of
either source-relay or relay-destination link increases, while
the increase of the SNR of source-destination link results in
lower SRTs. For future work, we will investigate the design of
the PNC coefficients at the relay with respect to the channel
gains of different links. Untrusted relay channels will be also
taken into account for the scenario when the relay as a third
party is not allowed to decode the confidential message.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Given Y =
a2X
b2X + 1
and X = c|Z|2 where c is a positive
constant, it can be deduced that a2 ≥ b2Y . The cdf of Y can
be computed by [45]
FY (y) = Pr{Y 6 y} = Pr
{
X 6 y
a2 − b2y
}
. (42)
Note that the pdf and cdf of X are given by
fX(x) =
1
c
exp
(
−x
c
)
, (43)
FX(x) = Pr{X 6 x} =
∫ x
0
fX(t)dt = 1− exp
(
−x
c
)
,
(44)
respectively. Substituting (44) into (42), we have
FY (y) = FX
(
y
a2 − b2y
)
= 1−exp
(
− y
c(a2 − b2y)
)
(45)
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The pdf of Y can be therefore obtained by
fY (y) =
dFY (y)
dy
=
a2
c(a2 − b2y)2 exp
[
− y
c(a2 − b2y)
]
.
(46)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For brevity, let X = γSR, Y = γSD, Z = γRD, U = γSE
and V = γRE . We can rewrite (14) as
P
(PMF )
out = Pr
{[
log2
(
1 + min{X,Y + Z}
1 + U + V
)]+
< 2θRs
}
.
(47)
Note that the secure communication is possible with a positive
secrecy capacity if the legitimate links, including the direct
and/or relaying links, have higher channel gains over the
eavesdropper links. In order to prevent the secrecy outage from
always happening, it is assumed that min{X,Y +Z} > U+V .
From (47), we have
P
(PMF )
out = Pr
{
log2
(
1 + min{X,Y + Z}
1 + U + V
)
< 2θRs
}
= Pr
{
2−2Rs(1 + min{X,Y + Z})− 1 < U + V } ,
(48)
Considering two scenarios of X 6 Y + Z and X > Y + Z,
(48) can be rewritten by (49) (see the top of next page).
Deriving P1 and P2 in (49), it can be observed that, if X 6
min{Y, 22θRs − 1}, then Pr{2−2θRs(1 +X)− 1 < U + V <
X} = 1 and Pr{X 6 Y + Z} = 1 since U + V > 0 and
Z > 0. This means P1 = 1 and P2 = 0, i. e. P (PMF )out = 1
(outage occurs). Similarly, if Y + Z 6 min{X, 22θRs − 1},
then Pr{2−2θRs(1 + Y + Z) − 1 < U + V < Y + Z} =
1 and Pr{X > Y + Z} = 1 since U + V > 0, and thus
outage happens. Therefore, in order to avoid the outage, by
considering all these above conditions, we can arrive at (50)
and (51) (see the top of next page).
For simplicity, let us define
I1(x) ,
∫ x
0
fU (u)
∫ x−u
2−2θRs (1+x)−1−u
fV (v) dv du, (52)
I2(x) ,
∫ x
0
fU (u)
∫ x−u
0
fV (v) dv du. (53)
Substituting (50) and (51) into (49) with I1(x) and I2(x), the
theorem is proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
> 0, there exist x1 > 0 and x2 > 0
such that
f(x1)− f(0)
x1
>
g(x2)− g(0)
x2
. (54)
If f(0) < g(0), then there exists a crossing point x′ = x1 =
x2 > 0 such that f(x′) = g(x′) and thus (f(x′)−f(0))/x′ >
(g(x′)− g(0))/x′ satisfying (54). Conversely, if there exists a
crossing point x′ = x1 = x2 > 0 satisfying (54), then we can
easily deduce that f(0) < g(0).
Proof of uniqueness: Let us assume that there exists 0 <
x′′ 6= x′ satisfying f(x′′) = g(x′′) and f(x′) = g(x′). We
have
f(x′′)− f(x′)
x′′ − x′ =
g(x′′)− g(x′)
x′′ − x′ , (55)
which contradicts the fact that
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
.
Therefore, we can conclude that ∃!x′ > 0 : f(x′) = g(x′)
if and only if f(0) < g(0).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In the DT protocol, as Rs → 0, it can be observed from
(26) that
P
(DT )
out →
γ¯SE
γ¯SD + γ¯SE
, P (DT )0 . (56)
In the RT protocol, as Rs → 0, Φ(x) in (37) approaches
Φ(x)→
(
1 +
x
γ¯SR
)(
1
γ¯−1SR + x−1
− 1
γ¯−1SE + γ¯
−1
SR + x−1
)
=
x2γ¯SR
xγ¯SR + xγ¯SE + γ¯SRγ¯SE
.
(57)
Substituting (57) into (36), the limit of P (RT )out can be obtained
by (58) (see the top of next page).
Denote ∆ = P (RT )0 − P (DT )0 . Solving ∆ < 0, after
some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the condition
of the channel quality of various links as in (59) (see the
top of next page). It can be seen that, if γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR,
γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2 and γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2, then ∆ < 0,
i.e. P (RT )0 < P
(DT )
0 . Additionally, as in the conventional
relaying scheme, the gradient of the GSOP performance of the
RT scheme is higher than that of the DT scheme and the GSOP
of both schemes increases as a function of the target secrecy
rate, i.e.
dP
(RT )
out
dRs
>
dP
(DT )
out
dRs
> 0. Therefore, from Proposition
1, we can conclude that ∃!R′s > 0 : P (DT )out (R′s) = P (RT )out (R′s).
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